by Kaleigh Beth Shaw*

* J.D. Candidate, 2026, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law; B.B.A. 2021, University of Kentucky—Lexington, Kentucky. Special thanks to my faculty advisor, Amy Berg, and to John Shoup and Mark Thornburg for guidance on these issues facing American farmers. This note is written in honor of the greatest farmers I know—my late grandfather, Rocky Shaw, and late father, Rex Shaw.

Introduction

Agriculture is one of the most important sectors in our state, nation, and world. In 2023, agriculture and related industries contributed over $1.530 trillion to the U.S. gross domestic product.[1] Many countries around the world depend on U.S. commodities, and agriculture is at the center of the discussion on tariffs and foreign trade.[2] However, these trillions do not all return to the denim overall pockets of your local farmer. Despite the unpredictability inherent in farming, there is one expense farmers can rely on besides the cost of seed or diesel fuel—commodity checkoffs.

Commodity checkoffs, government programs where farmers contribute a percentage or flat rate of each sale to a shared fund, are not a novel concept. As early as the 1930s, farmers voluntarily pooled money to promote their products in the market.[3] Starting in the 1960s with cotton, these programs transformed from voluntary pools into mandatory assessments on farmers’ commodity sales.[4] The purpose of checkoffs, formally known as Research and Promotion Boards (R&P Boards), is to “maintain or expand markets and uses for the commodity” through promotion, research, and consumer and industry information.[5] Each R&P Board is overseen by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA AMS).[6]

Market development and finding new uses for commodities is a key responsibility of R&P Boards, especially as American farmers face uncertain commodity prices imposed by competing international exporters, tariffs, and trade wars.[7] [A1] R&P Boards are also responsible for several familiar marketing campaigns. For example, the “Got Milk?” banners in the middle school cafeteria and the black billboards proclaiming “Beef: It’s What’s for Dinner,” are funded by checkoffs.[8] These advertisements are not attributed to any single farmer, but instead, are intended to promote overall demand for that particular commodity.[9]

This generic marketing has been the subject of litigation multiple times.[10] While each commodity group would presumably welcome increased demand for its respective commodity, specialty producers, such as those of grass-fed, organic, or breed-specific varieties, object to marketing that suggests all types of the commodity are the same.[11] Even though the statutory authority for the checkoffs specifically allows farmers to share individualized messaging,[12] generic advertising explicitly contradicts the specialty producers’ claim that their specialty product is better.[13] Addressing this challenge, the Supreme Court held in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association that checkoff messaging is government speech and not susceptible to First Amendment scrutiny, even if some farmers disagree with the general message of the funded advertising.[14]

With the First Amendment challenges to checkoffs seemingly settled, farmers’ concerns transitioned into transparent accounting. Farmers are required to pay into these checkoffs, yet many do not know or understand what the money funds.[15] Even more problematic, farmers worry their dollars are misused or working against them.[16] State and federal investigations confirm these fears.[17] However, Congress’s prior attempts to shake up the current commodity checkoff environment miss the mark and fail to realistically recognize the needs of farmers, USDA, and third-party organizations representing our nation’s farmers.[18]

This includes the Opportunities for Fairness in Farming Act (OFF Act). The OFF Act calls for a broad prohibition on R&P Board contracts with any organization that may lobby and for greater transparency in checkoff spending.[19] The OFF Act intends to eliminate relationships between R&P Boards and third-party organizations, such as between the Beef Board and the National Cattleman’s Beef Association (NCBA).[20] After halting these connections, the OFF Act proposes additional periodic reports and inspections to showcase how R&P Boards truly spend farmers’ hard-earned dollars.[21] Although this oversight is needed,  the OFF Act as proposed goes too far and risks severing long-running relationships that ultimately benefit farmers.

This note argues that repeated misuse of checkoff funding justifies the passage of a version of the OFF Act to promote greater transparency in checkoff spending. As proposed, the OFF Act specifically calls for a prohibition on checkoff funds being sent to lobbying organizations, for R&P Board budgets and expenditures to be publicized, and mandates audits by the USDA Inspector General and U.S. Comptroller General to ensure compliance with lobbying restrictions.[22] Part I outlines the historical need for pooled agricultural resources and voluntary contributions, and the shift to mandatory checkoffs. Part II describes the current statutory scheme governing federal and state R&P Boards, specifically the Commodity Promotion, Research, and Information Act of 1996. Part III summarizes the First Amendment challenges to mandatory checkoffs and explains why demanding transparency through legislation is currently the best approach. Part IV examines instances of alleged checkoff dollar misuse, both to influence government legislation and the impermissible use of funds. Finally, Part V argues how the OFF Act can bridge the gap between farmers and R&P Boards by providing increased oversight and transparency. Successful implementation of the OFF Act will help transform the checkoffs back into the types of agreements American farmers voluntarily entered years ago.

I. Regulatory Background

The history of R&P Boards largely begins with the Great Depression’s impact on government efforts to save agricultural commodity prices, followed by subsequent pieces of legislation, and the development of today’s regulatory environment. When marketing agreements were first introduced, farmers participated to ensure they could feed their families and keep the farm.[23] Today, crop insurance and other forms of USDA assistance protect farmers against some—but not all—of these uncertainties.[24] Ensuring R&P Boards properly spend checkoff dollars will better guarantee that the best interests of farmers are the top priority.

A. Early Beginnings

The name “checkoff” derives from voluntary marketing agreements farmers entered in the 1930s, indicated by checking a box on a form.[25] To respond to the financial troubles of the Great Depression, Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) in 1933 as part of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal.[26] The AAA sought to stabilize falling commodity prices by reducing surpluses and subsidizing farmers who only planted the prescribed quantity.[27] The landmark Commerce Clause case, Wickard v. Filburn, challenged the AAA’s quantity restrictions.[28] In Wickard v. Filburn, the Court upheld the AAA’s quantity restrictions, ruling that a farmer could not grow more wheat than the law allowed, even for personal use, because the cumulative impact of such excess production could affect interstate commerce.[29]

To address these constitutional concerns and others, Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) in 1937 to reenact, amend, and supplement the AAA,[30] setting the stage for subsequent mandatory checkoff programs.

B. The Cotton Research and Promotion Program and Cotton Board

The Cotton Research and Promotion Program, the first mandatory commodity checkoff, was created in 1966.[31] Through this statutory scheme, Congress authorized the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to establish a structured system of assessing all cotton sold in the United States.[32] The funds generated support research and general promotion efforts aimed at increasing domestic and foreign demand for cotton.[33] The authorizing statutes delegate to the Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary) the task of issuing a marketing order to create the mandatory checkoff.[34] The subsequent marketing order created the Cotton Board, the entity that administers the cotton checkoff.[35] Among other activities, the Cotton Board is responsible for administering “The Fabric of Our Lives” marketing campaign.[36]

After the Cotton Board was created, Congress authorized the Secretary to issue marketing orders for many other commodities.[37] R&P Boards for eggs, beef, fluid milk, Hass avocados, mushrooms, dairy, pork, potatoes, watermelons, popcorn, and soybeans all exist under specific authorizing statutes.[38] Because these R&P Boards can only be created if a majority of farmers agree through a referendum,[39] a process where farmers vote to establish, continue, or abolish the checkoff, the existence of subsequent boards indicates that farmers at one time believed that organized marketing efforts would benefit the industry as a whole.

C. The Commodity Promotion, Research, and Information Act of 1996

As more farmers witnessed the benefits of collective marketing and research, a more streamlined means of authorizing new R&P Boards became necessary. As part of the 1996 Farm Bill, Congress passed the Commodity Promotion, Research, and Information Act of 1996 (1996 Act), codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.[40] The 1996 Act granted authority for R&P Boards to be created for commodities without a specific statute.[41] Subsequently, new R&P Boards for lamb, pecans, Christmas trees, blueberries, honey, mangoes, peanuts, paper and packaging, softwood lumber, and sorghum were created without separate, explicit Congressional approval.[42] With an easier process to create an R&P Board, legislation to ensure those boards follow the statutory mandates is crucial.

D. Third-Party Organizations

In addition to federal and state checkoffs, farmers may pool money voluntarily through third-party organizations. Examples of these organizations include, but are not limited to, the National Cattleman’s Beef Association (NCBA), National Pork Producers Council (NPPC), and American Soybean Association (ASA). One key difference between these organizations and R&P Boards is that these third-party organizations are permitted to influence government legislation through lobbying. Because Congress prohibits checkoff dollars from being spent on lobbying, third-party organizations perform an important function for the industry that R&P Boards cannot.[43]

In addition, R&P Boards may contract with these third-party organizations to conduct promotional and research activities.[44] However, these close bonds may cause problems. For example, the USDA’s Inspector General called for the Pork Board and AMS to regain “control” over checkoff-funded activities relinquished to NPPC in 1999.[45] R&P Boards are aware that many of these issues have persisted since that Inspector General report. For example, in January 2025, the Beef Board shared a podcast recorded earlier in 2024 explaining current USDA oversight and precautions taken by the Beef Board to ensure that checkoff dollars are properly used.[46] The fact that R&P Boards hear farmers’ concerns strengthens the case for federal legislation to establish minimum standards for financial transparency. While R&P Boards recognize these concerns, they lack a unified structure to effectively address them.

II. Statutory Scheme of the 1996 Act

For this note, statutory analysis is confined to the 1996 Act. Understanding the statutory framework of the 1996 Act is essential for understanding what R&P Boards are legally required to do or prohibited from doing.

A. Commodity Promotion and Evaluation

Congress defines “commodity promotion law” as any law authorizing USDA to establish and operate promotion programs for agricultural commodities through “promotion, research, industry information, or consumer information activities” to “maintain or expand” demand for such commodities through mandatory checkoffs.[47] Most relevant to this discussion, Congress specifies the differences between generic advertising encouraged by commodity promotion laws and individual advertising paid for by a farmer.[48] Commodity promotion laws and R&P Boards do not restrict, and should not replace, an individual farmer’s right to fund individual advertisements tailored to its brand.[49] Instead, such laws and R&P Boards are created as a “‘self-help’ mechanism[]” for small-scale farmers to reap the benefits of costly scientific research and national marketing campaigns at a fraction of the cost.[50]

Notably, this section requires each R&P Board established by USDA to conduct an independent evaluation of the effectiveness of the board’s activities, submit the report to the Secretary, and make the results available to the public.[51]

B. Issuance of Orders for Promotion, Research, and Information Activities Regarding Agricultural Commodities

Subchapter II further specifies the purpose of organized commodity promotion law, the processes the Secretary must follow in issuing marketing orders, and prescribes a democratic process for farmers to establish, continue, or end a particular order.[52] This section of the note omits some sections in subchapter II and focuses on those most relevant to this discussion.

1. Findings and Purpose

In section 7411, Congress emphasizes that agriculture is a vital piece of the American economy because so many people are involved in producing and consuming agricultural commodities.[53] Congress further notes how finding new uses and generating demand for these commodities through generic advertising is beneficial for economic growth.[54] To best meet the program goals and expand commodity markets, Congress indicates that “coordinated” efforts and “[i]ndependent evaluation of the effectiveness” of these activities are necessary.[55] Congress provides four purposes for enacting organized commodity promotion law:[56]

(1) [to] strengthen the position of agricultural commodity industries in the marketplace; (2) maintain and expand existing domestic and foreign markets and uses for agricultural commodities; (3) develop new markets and uses for agricultural commodities; or (4) assist producers in meeting their conservation objectives.[57]

Overall, commodity promotion law is intended to ensure farmers have a place to sell their commodities and realize returns.

2. Issuance of Orders

Section 7413 authorizes the Secretary to issue national marketing orders for agricultural commodities.[58] Both the Secretary and farmers of an agricultural commodity can propose a marketing order.[59] Proposed marketing orders must be published in the Federal Register to provide notice and opportunity for public comment.[60]

3. Required Terms in Orders

Section 7414 prescribes what a marketing order issued by the Secretary must include.[61] First, each order must establish an R&P Board to manage the checkoff, and the R&P Board’s duties and powers.[62] Other than general administrative duties, and most relevant here, the board must annually prepare and submit to the Secretary assessment rates and its budget, enter into contracts with third parties to conduct promotion, research, and information activities, and maintain records of actions, transactions, and meetings.[63] Budgets, contracts, and records are all subject to inspection or audit.[64] Specifically, section 7414(g)(2) requires R&P Boards to conduct independent audits and report the findings to the Secretary.[65] However, this section does not require audit results to be made available to the public or farmers.

Section 7414(d) is the provision that prohibits checkoff funds from being used to lobby.[66] R&P Boards cannot engage in actions that may be a conflict of interest, use checkoff funds to influence legislation or government actions, or authorize activities “that may be false or misleading or disparaging to another agricultural commodity.”[67] Section 7414 also requires administrative expenses incurred in operating the R&P Board to be paid for by checkoff funds.[68]

4. Assessments

Section 7416 authorizes the Secretary to impose a mandatory checkoff on farmers through a marketing order.[69] The R&P Board is tasked with recommending an assessment rate to the Secretary, which takes effect if she approves.[70] The marketing order may include terms that prohibit rate increases unless a majority of farmers approve the increase through a referendum.[71]

5. Referenda

Referenda are important pieces of commodity promotion law to ensure farmers have a voice in establishing and maintaining the marketing order. Before a marketing order takes effect, the Secretary may conduct an initial referendum among eligible farmers to approve or disapprove the order.[72] Once a final marketing order is issued, the Secretary must conduct a referendum within the first three years to assess whether farmers want to continue, suspend, or terminate the order.[73] After this first referendum, the Secretary must conduct subsequent referenda within seven years after the checkoff begins, at the request of the R&P Board, or upon petition of ten percent of eligible farmers.[74] The Secretary ultimately determines how notice is provided to farmers, so long as it is provided at least thirty days before any referendum.[75] Currently, notice is typically published in the Federal Register and in coordination with local Farm Service Agency (FSA) offices.[76] Ideally, the referenda process gives farmers a say in what message is endorsed by their respective R&P Board.

III. First Amendment Freedom of Speech Challenges

Although referenda provide a democratic process, some farmers disagree with the messaging funded by checkoff programs and believe the mandatory nature of these assessments violates the First Amendment. The heart of these First Amendment challenges is that farmers feel forced to pay for advertising they do not wish to fund.

A. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.

The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in Glickman v. Wileman Bros & Elliott, Inc., holding that generic advertising funded by California citrus growers under the AMAA did not violate the First Amendment.[77] The advertisements promoted California summer fruits as “wholesome, delicious, and attractive.”[78] Wileman, a citrus grower, refused to pay its marketing assessments after experiencing subpar yields and challenged the marketing order.[79] The district court upheld the order and ordered the collective fruit handlers to pay $3.1 million in past due assessments.[80] The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the mandatory assessments violated producers’ First Amendment commercial speech rights because the advertising did not directly advance the government interest and was not narrowly tailored.[81]

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, distinguishing the order from other unconstitutional programs.[82]It emphasizes that citrus growers could still express their own messages, were not forced to share symbolic or ideological speech, and were not compelled to endorse politics.[83]Finding that generic advertising advanced the collective goals of California citrus growers, the Court upheld the program.[84]

B. United States v. United Foods, Inc.

In contrast, the Court struck down the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act, which funded only advertising.[85] United Foods disagreed with the “forced subsidy” for generic advertising because it preferred to promote its own brand.[86]Unlike in Glickman, the mushroom checkoff lacked a broader regulatory scheme.[87] The Court held that compelled funding of commercial speech (mushroom promotion) alone violated the First Amendment, unless the funds were also used for ancillary programming.[88]

The Court also distinguished the mushroom order from Glickman because mushroom growers are not forced to participate in a cooperative market, whereas citrus growers are under the AMAA.[89]The Government contended, but the Court refused to consider, that the mandatory checkoff funded government speech, and thus was not subject to First Amendment scrutiny.[90]

C. Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association

Soon after, the Court upheld the beef checkoff as government speech, not subject to First Amendment scrutiny.[91] Relying on United Foods, farmers and agricultural associations objected  to funding advertisements favoring generic beef over specific breeds or raising practices.[92] The Court presented two categories of “compelled expression.”[93] First, compelled speech, which occurs when an individual must share a disagreeable, government-imposed message.[94] Second, compelled subsidy, which occurs when an individual must “subsidize” disagreeable, private speech.[95] This case presented a unique consideration of whether a government-compelled subsidy of the government’s speech, not a private entity, violated the First Amendment. The Court reasoned this practice was analogous to any other government program funded by taxpayer dollars.[96] The beef promotion campaigns were likewise entirely government-controlled because the Secretary approved, oversaw, and could modify all messaging, and even remove R&P Board members.[97] Given the significant government oversight, the Court upheld the beef checkoff as government speech.[98]

D. R-CALF v. Vilsack

After Johanns, ranchers expanded the checkoff challenge, arguing that distributing checkoff funds to Qualified State Beef Councils (QSBCs) violated the First Amendment when those state councils contracted with third parties without the Secretary’s approval.[99] In R-CALF v. Vilsack, the Ninth Circuit held the speech of both the QSBCs and third parties was government speech because the messaging was “effectively controlled” by the government.[100] The Secretary, through USDA AMS, exercises pre-approval authority under memoranda of understanding (MOUs) entered into with QSBCs.[101] MOUs require the Secretary to approve all promotional activities, research, and consumer information projects.[102] Non-compliant QSBCs risk de-certification.[103] The Secretary’s oversight provided effective control, rendering the speech constitutional.[104]

IV. Dirty Dealings?

Because checkoffs have been repeatedly deemed permissible government speech, absent a referendum, they are not going away. Even with First Amendment challenges seemingly settled, many farmers still worry their funds are not used to further their interests.[105] The current audit procedures prescribed by Congress and USDA appear insufficient to ensure checkoff dollars are not misused to influence government action or otherwise mishandled.

A. Lobbying

Section 7414(d)(2) specifically prohibits R&P Boards from using checkoff funds “for the purpose of influencing any legislation or governmental action or policy.”[106] Despite checkoff-funded lobbying being illegal, farmers share concerns that loopholes exist when R&P Boards contract with third-party organizations without lobbying restrictions.[107]

Some examples of these workarounds are the contracts between the Beef Board and the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA) or the Pork Board and the National Pork Producers Council (NPPC). As the statutorily created R&P Board for beef farmers, the Beef Board cannot lobby.[108] NCBA, NPPC, and a handful of other third parties are not considered government entities and, therefore, are not subject to the same lobbying restrictions. But the roots run deep. In FY 2025, the Beef Board will provide NCBA with over $25 million of checkoff funds.[109] Although the Secretary must approve R&P Board budgets,[110] without greater transparency, farmers struggle to trust that checkoff funds are appropriately spent or reallocated to prohibit lobbying. This mistrust may persist, even if an R&P Board strictly follows each requirement.[111]

Other than compliance with a statutory prohibition, why does it matter if checkoff funds are spent on influencing legislation? While generic advertising and industry research benefit all producers, large or small, lobbying activities often benefit only the larger farmers who can afford it. There is a drastic difference in operational structures, capital resources, and goals of large-scale agriculture giants compared to small farmers. As a result, properly representing everyone’s interests is a difficult task. Frankly, the interests of these two groups often differ, even if the same commodity binds them. The recent debates over mandatory country-of-origin labeling (MCOOL) are a pressing example.[112]

While Lobbying Disclosure Reports are available online, making available how these lobbying efforts are funded is important for farmers to understand where and how the checkoff is used.[113] This transparency allows the farmers to determine if their interests are served and act accordingly through the referenda process.

B. Lacking Financial Statements

Another issue with inconsistent transparency is the ability for funds to be misspent with little oversight. From 2009 to 2016, a longtime Oklahoma Beef Council employee embezzled over $2.6 million worth of checkoff dollars.[114] The forensic accounting report further indicated that bank statements and checkoff assessments were not properly reconciled during this period.[115] The former employee was sentenced to federal prison and ordered to pay the Oklahoma Beef Council restitution.[116] It is unclear how this scheme went unnoticed for so long given its magnitude, but this example of embezzled checkoff dollars justifies enhanced audit procedures and greater transparency for both state and federal R&P Boards.

C. Lackluster Independent Audits

A third issue that fails to promote trust is the scope and focus of the current independent audits conducted on R&P Boards each year. Section 7414(g)(2) requires R&P Boards to submit annual financial audits to the Secretary.[117] When reading independent audits from 2024 for the beef, pork, and soybean R&P Boards, none reported compliance issues with checkoff funds being used to influence government action.[118]

However, each audit noted that the purpose of establishing compliance with lobbying restrictions was not a purpose of the audit. The Beef Board’s 2023 audit report goes as far as to say that “other matters may have come to [the auditor’s] attention regarding the Board’s noncompliance” if additional audit procedures were employed.[119] When properly followed, existing audit requirements may suffice to curtail R&P Board embezzlement or other financial misuse. However, current law does not require R&P Board audits to certify compliance with lobbying restrictions.

V. Turning the Soil

So long as checkoffs are mandatory, clearer guidance is needed for R&P Boards to ensure their internal practices truly uphold the best interests of farmers. R&P Boards provide a means of collective action that farmers cannot achieve individually. Thus, a strong and trusting relationship between farmers and R&P Boards is crucial for agriculture. This section will outline the OFF Act’s language and potential counterarguments against its passage as written. Then, it will outline alternative language and recommendations to modify the OFF Act to a form that will garner the necessary votes to pass Congress and protect America’s farmers.

A. Bill Language

The OFF Act begins by outlining the need for legislation, finding that checkoff funds have repeatedly been used to influence legislation when R&P Boards work with lobbying organizations, despite the current prohibition.[120] It further emphasizes that strict separation between R&P Boards and lobbying organizations is necessary to prevent this misuse and other conflicts of interest.[121] Lastly, the bill finds that greater transparency in checkoff spending would “prevent and uncover abuses in checkoff programs.”[122]

If enacted, the OFF Act would prohibit all R&P Boards from contracting with any lobbying entity to carry out checkoff-approved activities.[123] Further, R&P Boards and employees would be prohibited from engaging in activities that may be a conflict of interest or activities that are anticompetitive, unfair, deceptive, or may disparage another commodity.[124] However, such activities are already prohibited through existing commodity promotion laws.[125]

The OFF Act would further require any entity contracting with an R&P Board to maintain records of funds received and costs incurred under the contract.[126] The most relevant subsection of the bill requires R&P Boards to publish “all budgets and disbursements of funds” after such reports are approved by the Secretary.[127] The report must include:

(A) the amount of the disbursement; (B) the purpose of the disbursement, including the activities to be funded by the disbursement; (C) the identity of the recipient of the disbursement; and (D) the identity of any other parties that may receive the disbursed funds, including any contracts or subcontractors of the recipient of the disbursement.[128]

Thus, the report details any and all information that will help an auditor ensure compliance in contractor relationships.

Finally, the OFF Act would impose additional audit requirements on R&P Boards by both the Inspector General of USDA and the Comptroller General. The Inspector General must audit each R&P Board at least every five years to ensure it complies with the OFF Act and other existing commodity promotion laws.[129] This audit includes the reports required under subsection (c)(1).[130] After completing this first audit, the Inspector General must then prepare a report to be submitted to Congress and the Comptroller General.[131] Next, the Comptroller General must conduct an audit to evaluate the R&P Board’s progress in ensuring compliance with the OFF Act and the degree to which these actions have improved the integrity of the R&P Board.[132] Lastly, the Comptroller General must compile the findings in both audits to recommend actions for R&P Boards and improve federal commodity promotion law.[133]

The 2019 version of the OFF Act inserted an important exception to the prohibition against R&P Boards contracting with third-party organizations that may lobby.[134] In the 2019 version, and beyond, R&P Boards may contract with institutions of higher education for research and information purposes, despite the institutions’ lobbying capabilities.[135] This provision carves out an important exception so R&P Boards and farmers can maintain strong relationships with public land-grant universities.[136] Practically, this protects research contracts with strong agricultural colleges, like Purdue University here in Indiana.[137][A2]  Even with the land-grant exception, the OFF Act does not yet balance American farmers’ goals and realities.

B. Counterarguments and Considerations

While the higher-education exception is a significant change, the OFF Act must be further modified before it can truly protect farmers’ best interests. For example, R&P Boards’ ability to contract with all lobbying-capable organizations (save higher-education institutions) would derail established marketing campaigns, leading to more checkoff dollars unnecessarily spent on activities that do not help farmers, particularly more administrative costs.

R&P Boards and third-party organizations have a long, intermingled history. The Beef Board and NCBA, the Pork Board and NPPC, the United Soybean Board and ASA are a few, but far from all, of these relationships. This interconnectedness is evidenced by the length of time and amount of money dedicated to their most successful marketing campaigns. To name a few, “Beef: It’s What’s for Dinner,” “Cotton: The Fabric of Our Lives,” and “Got Milk?” all originated in the late 1980s or early 1990s.[138] [A3] These campaigns are funded by checkoffs. In fact, these generic campaigns are one of the primary purposes of commodity promotion law.[139] What distinguishes these relationships from a typical company’s relationship with an advertising agency is the specialized expertise of the boards. The third parties contracting with R&P Boards are typically well-versed in the commodity because the organization is largely led by farmers elected to the roles.[140][A4]  Because the relationships between R&P Boards and their associated third-party organizations are deeply intertwined, disrupting this balance could be detrimental to farmers. Even if the R&P Board contracts directly with a marketing firm, losing the third-party organization as an intermediary with agricultural communication experience may add unnecessary time and expense. This additional time is at the expense of farmers’ checkoff dollars.

Another issue with a sweeping prohibition on these third-party contracts is using checkoff dollars to fund the creation of a new organization to take the place of those third parties. Section 7414(e)(4) requires all administrative costs or costs incurred through research, promotion, or consumer information activities by the R&P Board to be paid for by checkoff dollars.[141] To maintain the long-standing relationships R&P Boards enjoy with third-party organizations, a new non-lobbying spinoff would need to be created to meet the requirements of the OFF Act as currently written. Unless the third-party organization graciously used its voluntary membership dues to pay for this separation, the cost of establishing and staffing an independent entity for only research and promotion must be reimbursed with checkoff dollars. While farmers share mixed concerns about their interests being represented by lobbying, using checkoff funds for more administrative costs than necessary further chips away at the funds available for research and promotion.

A final counterargument against the bill, as proposed, is that many pieces of the OFF Act are duplicative. Thus, administrative enforcement is more appropriate than legislation. First, § 7414(d) already prohibits checkoff funds from being used to influence legislation or government action.[142] The OFF Act tightens this restriction by prohibiting all contracts with lobbying organizations, even for checkoff-friendly activities.[143] Second, this section also prohibits R&P Boards and employees from engaging in actions that constitute a conflict of interest or advertising that is false, misleading, or disparaging to other commodities.[144] However, the OFF Act’s additional prohibition against anticompetitive, unfair, or deceptive activities may be necessary because the statutes do not already prohibit it. Lastly, § 7414(f) already requires entities contracting with an R&P Board to maintain and submit accurate records of the agreement, including a budget, accurate records of costs, funds received and spent, and any other report required by the R&P Board or Secretary.[145] This statutory reporting requirement makes § 4(c) of the OFF Act unnecessary.

C. Recommendations

Given these considerations, the OFF Act must be amended before it can be passed by Congress. First, certain portions should be amended or altogether omitted to avoid repetitively banning what is already prohibited by the 1996 Act and other commodity promotion laws. Second, the OFF Act should recognize existing mechanisms within commodity promotion law that let farmers, not Congress, determine whether their checkoff is serving their best interests. Finally, a summary of these critiques is recommended as language Congress should adopt in further considering and passing the OFF Act.

1. Statutory Changes

To avoid these impacts and increase industry acceptance, the OFF Act should focus less on regulating R&P Board contractual abilities and more on transparency for checkoff-paying farmers and the public. If proposed again in the 119^th Congress, the OFF Act should focus on §§ 4(d) and 4(e)’s public transparency and audit requirements. Section 4(d) solves confusion among farmers on how their checkoff dollars are being spent because it stipulates that R&P Boards would publish budgets and expenditures for public inspection. Section 4(e) helps USDA better enforce the required terms in marketing orders by placing R&P Board records in front of both the USDA Inspector General and the U.S. Comptroller General. The 1996 Act and commodity-specific authorizing statutes already require annual financial audits, but these audits largely ignore lobbying compliance.[146] Enforcing existing statutes and adding public inspection requirements enhance transparency and indicate to farmers that USDA will hold violators accountable. Audits that specifically focus on compliance with lobbying restrictions address possible shortcomings of the audits currently required by statute. For farmers to understand where their checkoff dollars go and to make informed decisions about requesting a refund, directing their checkoff assessment to a state organization, or voting in a referendum, they need to understand their board’s finances.

2. Referenda Accessibility

Another existing tool in commodity promotion law that can complement the enhanced procedures proposed by the OFF Act is the referendum process. However, the participation levels in recent opportunities to request a referendum are sparse.[147] At first glance, this could suggest farmers are happy with their commodity checkoff and do not wish to amend or end their respective programs. As evidenced by calls for checkoff reform, this is not entirely the case.[148] Instead, low participation rates may be caused by farmers lacking adequate notice of the opportunity to request a referendum.

In February 2024, USDA AMS posted notice of the opportunity for soybean farmers to request a referendum in the Federal Register.[149] The Secretary must publish notice in the Federal Register and the United Soybean Board must provide written notice to soybean farmers.[150] Farmers may cast their votes in person at their county Farm Service Agency (FSA) office or by mail.[151] Ten percent of eligible soybean farmers are required to successfully request a referendum.[152] In 2024, this figure worked out to 41,336 farmers,[153] but only 207 eligible soybean farmers voted to hold a referendum.[154] Given this disparity, is the statutorily required notice sufficient to serve as effective notice?

When visiting the FSA website, little to no information is published about opportunities for checkoff referendum. Continuing with the soybean example, no results were generated when searching the FSA News tab for “checkoff.”[155] Using the same search criteria, nothing appeared under the National Deadlines for FSA tab.[156] Posting notice and reminders of the opportunity to request a referendum on the FSA website is a simple way to push the message out to farmers.

This recommendation to post notice and reminders online makes strategic sense for three reasons. First, farmers already interact with FSA regularly because of the wide swath of federal agriculture programs administered by FSA, including conservation efforts, crop insurance, and farm loans.[157] Second, because the costs to conduct a referendum are reimbursed by checkoff dollars, posting notice and reminders on the FSA website is more economical than printing and mailing this information to each farmer.[158]

Lastly, and possibly the most compelling reason, farmers are busy. They work from sunup to sundown to put food on our tables, whether it be milking cows at 4 a.m. or running a combine until 10 p.m. to get the last few acres of corn out of the field. Furthermore, the average farmer lacks in-house legal counsel, an administrative assistant, or anyone else to regularly scan the Federal Register to check for these publications. Given the simplicity and relatively low cost of digital communications, publishing this information on the FSA website is a clear-cut way to provide the backbone of our country a better means to protect their interests.

3. Proposed Amendments to the OFF Act

To balance these goals and critiques, three key changes should be made to the OFF Act to protect farmers while acknowledging the necessity of third-party contracts. First, § 2(10) should be amended to read:

Congress finds that—

(10) requiring transparency in the expenditure of checkoff program funds is necessary to prevent and uncover abuses in checkoff programs and allow farmers to make educated decisions when voting to continue or abolish such programs during referenda.

This change highlights the importance of referenda and how better understanding checkoff expenditures may promote participation in the process.

Second, § 4 should be amended to omit §§ 4(a), (b), and (c) to avoid legislative surplusage. The tools Congress has thus proposed to reform the checkoff programs, publishing financial records and two audits, can coexist with the current prohibitions against lobbying and anti-competitive behavior.

Finally, a new section addressing notice of referenda should be placed after § 4(e). To amend the current § 7417, § 4(f) should include:

This addition would subject all checkoff programs to the same statutory requirements for providing notice to eligible producers of the opportunity to request a referendum. Most importantly, this addition would require the Secretary to publish notice of the opportunity to request a referendum online on the FSA website and inside county FSA offices. This additional safeguard takes the headache out of scanning and understanding the Federal Register, and gives farmers more straightforward notice of their rights under commodity promotion law.

Conclusion

USDA AMS and R&P Boards have made group efforts toward resolving some conflicts of interest, but there is still room for improvement. Despite years of known checkoff funding misuse, neither USDA nor Congress has employed appropriate accountability measures to ensure farmers’ money is spent as intended. The OFF Act, with amendments to better represent farmers’ interests, is a great start to increasing financial transparency. With the amendments proposed here, the OFF Act would facilitate the use of checkoff funds, avoid unnecessary administrative costs, and add legitimacy to the programs by informing farmers and the public about their uses. Importantly, publicizing the interworking of R&P Boards keeps farmers informed and helps them understand their rights under the checkoff programs.

The Secretary should also rely on the governing statutes and regulations available to her in the interim. Increasing farmer participation in the legislative and administrative process is key to strengthening the checkoff programs for years to come. Just how people need to appreciate who grows their food and where, farmers need to know where their checkoff dollars go to reap the benefits of the investment. Without a better understanding of why a mandatory assessment comes off each load of grain delivered to the elevator or head of cattle, farmers will continue to possess a sense of mistrust for checkoffs. As long as checkoffs stay mandatory, farmers have the right to know how their money is used. Passage of the OFF Act and better enforcement will help ensure that their money is properly spent.

---

[1] Steven Zahniser, What is agriculture’s share of the overall U.S. economy?, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Rsch. Serv. (Dec. 19, 2024), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=58270 [https://perma.cc/232S-UHXW].

[2] 2025 Agricultural Trade and Tariffs Outlook, AgAmerica (Mar. 5, 2025), https://agamerica.com/blog/agricultural-trade-q1-2025 [https://perma.cc/D5M6-PFKB].

[3] Checkoff Corruption: It’s What’s for Dinner, Farm Action (Apr. 12, 2023), https://farmaction.us/2023/04/12/checkoff-corruption/#:~:text=It’s%20What’s%20for%20Dinner%E2%80%9D%20or,share%20how%20to%20heal%20it. [https://perma.cc/W543-NCM9].  

[4] Cotton Research and Promotion Act of 1966, 7 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq.

[5] 7 U.S.C. § 7401(a).

[6] Agricultural Marketing Service, Research & Promotion Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/research-promotion [https://perma.cc/Z3ZE-HHH6] (last visited Oct. 20, 2024).

[7] AgAmerica, supra note 2.

[8] Got Milk? And the California Milk Processor Board, Got Milk?, https://www.gotmilk.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/3GNE-E7SS] (last visited Oct. 21, 2024); About the Promotion Program, Beef Bd., https://www.beefboard.org/checkoff/beef-checkoff-programs/promotion [https://perma.cc/5S6F-NDWW] (last visited Oct. 21, 2024).

[9] 7 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(7).

[10] See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 544 U.S. 550 (2005); R-CALF v. Vilsack, 6 F.4th 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2021).

[11] Johanns, 544 U.S. at 556.

[12] 7 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(4)–(5).

[13] Johanns, 544 U.S. at 556.

[14] Id. at 566–67.

[15] Marcia Brown & Hailey Fuchs, Seeing viral pork TikToks? It’s a government-backed group pushing meat on Gen Z, Politico (Jan. 27, 2024), https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/27/the-federal-governments-role-in-those-tiktok-ads-for-milk-and-pork-00138178 [https://perma.cc/539U-Z56S].

[16] Farm Action, supra note 3.

[17] See, e.g., Oklahoma Beef Council Forensic Analysis and Assessment Report to the Board of Directors 4 (Oct. 6, 2016), available at https://farmandfoodfile.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Merge.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7AM-9HPY]; Reform Corrupt Checkoff Programs, Farm Action https://farmaction.us/checkoffreform/#:~:text=In%202010%2C%20an%20independent%20audit,been%20released%20to%20the%20public [https://perma.cc/CL7K-3FHZ] (last visited Mar. 15, 2025).

[18] See, e.g., Opportunities for Fairness in Farming Act of 2023, S. 557, 118th Cong. (2023); Voluntary Checkoff Program Participation Act, H.R. 5699, 116th Cong. (2020); H.R. 1752, 115th Cong. (2017).

[19] S. 557.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Farm Service Agency, Agency History, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.fsa.usda.gov/about-fsa/history-mission/agency- history [https://perma.cc/L86N-R9CP] (last visited Feb. 9, 2025).

[24] Id.

[25] Checkoff Programs–An Overview, Nat’l Agric. L. Ctr., https://nationalaglawcenter.org/overview/checkoff/ [https://perma.cc/8MFM-K9UE] (last visited Oct. 20, 2024).

[26] Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31.

[27] Id.

[28] 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

[29] Id. at 127–29.

[30] Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat. 246.

[31] Cotton Research and Promotion Act of 1966, 7 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq.

[32] 7 U.S.C. §2101.

[33] Id.

[34] 7 U.S.C. § 2102.

[35] 7 C.F.R. § 1205 (2024).

[36] Agricultural Marketing Service, Cotton Board, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/research-promotion/cotton#:~:text=Organizational%20Structure,and%20Cotton%20Incorporated%20activities%20updates [https://perma.cc/YN8F-D95L] (last visited Feb. 9, 2025).

[37] Agricultural Marketing Service, supra note 6.

[38] 7 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.; 7 C.F.R. § 1250 (2024); 7 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq.; 7 C.F.R. § 1260 (2024); 7 U.S.C. § 6401 et seq.; 7 C.F.R. § 1160 (2024); 7 U.S.C. § 7801 et seq.; 7 C.F.R. § 1219 (2024); 7 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq.; 7 C.F.R. § 1209 (2024); 7 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq.; 7 C.F.R. § 1150 (2024); 7 U.S.C. § 4801 et seq.; 7 C.F.R. § 1230 (2024); 7 U.S.C. § 2611 et seq.; 7 C.F.R. § 1207 (2024); 7 U.S.C. § 4901 et seq.; 7 C.F.R. § 1210 (2024); 7 U.S.C. § 7481 et seq.; 7 C.F.R. § 1215 (2024); 7 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq.; 7 C.F.R. § 1220 (2024).

[39] 7 U.S.C § 7417(a).

[40] Commodity Promotion, Research, and Information Act of 1996, 7 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.

[41] Id.

[42] See 7 C.F.R. § 1280 (2024); 7 C.F.R. § 1223 (2024); 7 C.F.R. § 1214 (2024); 7 C.F.R. § 1218 (2024); 7 C.F.R. § 1212 (2024); 7 C.F.R. § 1206 (2024); 7 C.F.R. § 1216 (2024); 7 C.F.R. § 1222 (2024); 7 C.F.R. § 1217 (2024); 7 C.F.R. § 1221 (2024).

[43] 7 U.S.C. § 7414(d)(2).

[44] Checkoff Contractors, Beef Bd., https://www.beefboard.org/checkoff/beef-checkoff-contractors [https://perma.cc/R2EP-RL8Q] (last visited Jan. 18, 2025).

[45] U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Inspector Gen., 01801-1-KC, Controls Over Pork Checkoff Funds 4 (1999) [https://perma.cc/UN8N-LAFX].

[46] Increased Transparency on the Beef Checkoff, Beef Bd., https://www.beefboard.org/2025/01/09/increased-transparency-on-the-beef-checkoff [https://perma.cc/6FR5-BRZL] (last visited Jan. 18, 2025); Will Jordan, 001, Pulling Back the Curtain on The Beef Checkoff: Sarah Metzler, The Stock Exchange Podcast (Sep. 3, 2024), https://thestockexchangepodcast.podbean.com/e/001-pulling-back-the-curtain-on-the-beef-checkoff-sarah-metzler [https://perma.cc/R65T-B6NE].

[47] 7 U.S.C. § 7401(a).

[48] 7 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(5)–(7).

[49] 7 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(4)–(5).

[50] 7 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(7)–(8), (10).

[51] 7 U.S.C. § 7401(c).

[52] 7 U.S.C. § 7411 et seq.

[53] 7 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)–(3).

[54] Id.

[55] 7 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(6)–(7).

[56] 7 U.S.C. § 7411(b).

[57] 7 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)–(4).

[58] 7 U.S.C. § 7413.

[59] 7 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(1).

[60] 7 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2).

[61] 7 U.S.C. § 7414.

[62] 7 U.S.C. § 7414(c).

[63] Id.

[64] 7 U.S.C. § 7414 (e)–(g).

[65] 7 U.S.C. § 7414(g)(2).

[66] 7 U.S.C. § 7414(d).

[67] Id.

[68] 7 U.S.C. § 7414(e).

[69] 7 U.S.C. § 7416.

[70] 7 U.S.C. § 7416(d).

[71] Id.

[72] 7 U.S.C. § 7417(a).

[73] 7 U.S.C. § 7417(b).

[74] 7 U.S.C. § 7417(c).

[75] 7 U.S.C. § 7417(g)(4).

[76] See Natural Grass Sod Promotion, Research, and Referendum Procedures, 89 Fed. Reg. 99059 (Dec. 10, 2024); 7 C.F.R. § 1221.220(a) (2025).

[77] 521 U.S. 457 (1997).

[78] Id. at 462.

[79] Id. at 463.

[80] Id. at 464.

[81] Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367, 1380 (9th Cir. 1995).

[82] Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 467 (1997) (citing United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989)).

[83] Id. at 467, 469–70.

[84] Id. at 476.

[85] United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001); 7 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq.

[86] United Foods, 533 U.S. at 409, 411. 

[87] Id. at 411–12.

[88] Id. at 415.

[89] Id. at 413–16.

[90] Id. at 416. The Government failed to raise the government speech argument in earlier proceedings.

[91] Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).

[92] Id. at 556.

[93] Id. at 557.

[94] Id.

[95] Id.

[96] Id. at 559.

[97] Id. at 563–64.

[98] Id.

[99] Ranchers –Cattlemen Action Legal Fund v. Vilsack, 6 F.4th 983 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2867 (2022).

[100] Id. at 991, 989.

[101] Id.

[102] Id. at 986.

[103] Id. at 989.

[104] Id. at 990.

[105] LeeAnne Bulman, Farmers say enough to checkoffs, Agri-view (June 17, 2024), https://agupdate.com/agriview/news/crop/farmers-say-enough-to-checkoffs/article_862e0b46-28fe-11ef-858d-ffe6535e8c97.html [https://perma.cc/C232-NTGX].

[106] 7 U.S.C. § 7414(d)(2).

[107] Farm Action, supra note 3.

[108] 7 U.S.C. § 2904(10).

[109] 2025 Beef Checkoff Program Funding, Beef Bd. (Oct. 24, 2024), https://www.beefboard.org/2024/10/24/2025-beef-checkoff-program-funding [https://perma.cc/7Y3E-XQNH].

[110] 7 C.F.R. § 1260.150 (2024).

[111] For example, Indiana Pork, a state R&P Board, keeps separate budgets for checkoff-only activities and activities that may be construed as lobbying. The lobbying budget is funded from sources other than producer checkoff dollars. However, as discussed below, farmers cannot know whether an R&P Board is lobbying if the annual audit does not check for such activity.

[112]  The NCBA and NPPC both lobbied against MCOOL for beef and pork products, leading to the eventual removal of these meats from MCOOL requirements in 2016. See National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, U.S. Senate, Lobbying Disclosure Report, Third Quarter 2015; National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, U.S. Senate, Lobbying Disclosure Report, Fourth Quarter 2015; National Pork Producers Council, U.S. Senate, Lobbying Disclosure Report, First Quarter 2015; Removal of Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling Requirements for Beef and Pork Muscle Cuts, Ground Beef, and Ground Pork, 81 Fed. Reg. 10755 (Mar. 2, 2016). Small producers may prefer MCOOL to differentiate American from foreign meat for consumers.

[113] Another example of conflicting goals lies within Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs). CAFOs are often scrutinized for animal conditions and environmental effects. See, e.g., Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356 (2023). No matter a farmer’s opinion on large-scale animal agriculture, they fund checkoff projects that support CAFO development.

[114] Kyle Schwab, Former accountant for Oklahoma Beef Council sentenced in multi-million dollar embezzlement scheme, The Oklahoman, (Jan. 5, 2018) https://www.oklahoman.com/story/business/2018/01/05/former-accountant-for-oklahoma-beef-council-sentenced-in-multi-million-dollar-embezzlement-scheme/60551485007 [https://perma.cc/5NAE-9Z8M].

[115] Id.

[116] Former Oklahoma Beef Council Employee Sentenced to 57 Months for $2.68 Million Embezzlement and Signing a False Tax Return, U.S. Atty’s Off., W. Dist. of Okla. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdok/pr/former-oklahoma-beef-council-employee-sentenced-57-months-268-million-embezzlement-and [https://perma.cc/7QSD-VQTS].

[117] 7 U.S.C. § 7414(g)(2).

[118] Cattlemen’s Beef Promotion and Research Board Independent Accountant’s Report, https://www.beefboard.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CBB-FY23-Final-Signed-Financial-Statements.pdf (Dec. 7, 2023) [https://perma.cc/HQ5X-WL4W]; National Pork Board Financial Statements and Compliance Report, https://www.porkcdn.com/sites/porkcheckoff/assets/files/2023NPBAuditedFinancialStatementsandComplianceReport_1724272859839.pdf (July 2, 2024) [https://perma.cc/V77K-NT45]; United Soybean Board Independent Auditor’s Report and Consolidated Financial Statements, https://unitedsoybean.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Final-FY22-USB-Audited-Financial-Statments-combined.pdf (Nov. 30, 2022) [https://perma.cc/5DPZ-K2QA].

[119] Cattlemen’s Beef Promotion and Research Board, supra note 118.

[120] Opportunities for Fairness in Farming Act, S. 557, 118thCong. § 2(2) (2023).

[121] S. 557 § 2(3)–(6).

[122] S. 557 § 2(9)–(10).

[123] S. 557 § 4(a)(1).

[124] S. 557 § 4(a)(2)–(3).

[125] 7 U.S.C. § 7414(d).

[126] Opportunities for Fairness in Farming Act, S. 557, 118th Cong. § 4(c) (2023).

[127] S. 557 § 4(d)(1).

[128] S. 557 § 4(d)(2).

[129] S. 557 § 4(e)(1)(A).

[130] S. 557 § 4(e)(1)(B).

[131] S. 557 § 4(e)(1)(C).

[132] Opportunities for Fairness in Farming Act, S. 557, 118th Cong. § 4(e)(2)(A) (2023).

[133] Id.

[134] Opportunities for Fairness in Farming Act, S. 935, 116th Cong. (2019).

[135] Id.

[136] Id.

[137] E.g., David Ching, What is a land-grant university? Purdue Univ.: The Persistent Pursuit (Mar. 13, 2023), https://stories.purdue.edu/what-is-a-land-grant-university [https://perma.cc/6NQP-M9D8].

[138] See Beef. It’s Still What’s for Dinner, Beef Bd. (July 30, 2020) https://www.beefboard.org/2020/07/30/beef-its-still-whats-for-dinner [https://perma.cc/2ERF-KGUZ]; Company Timeline, Cotton Inc., https://www.cottoninc.com/about-cotton/history/company-timeline [https://perma.cc/6N6R-VTUM] (last visited Dec. 2, 2024); Jake Rossen, Udder Success: A Brief History of the ‘Got Milk?’ Campaign,Mental Floss (Mar. 8, 2024), https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/565149/got-milk-ad-campaign-turns-25 [https://perma.cc/57N8-UC26].

[139] 7 U.S.C. § 7401(b).

[140] See generally NPPC Team, Nat’l Pork Producers Council, https://nppc.org/about-nppc/nppc-team [https://perma.cc/WV5D-P42T] (last visited Nov. 29, 2024); Board of Directors, Am. Soybean Ass’n, https://soygrowers.com/about/board-of-directors [https://perma.cc/M92Q-7C7T] (last visited Nov. 29, 2024).

[141] 7 U.S.C. § 7414(e)(4).

[142] 7 U.S.C. § 7414(d)(2).

[143] Opportunities for Fairness in Farming Act, S. 557, 118th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2023).

[144] 7 U.S.C. § 7414(d).

[145] 7 U.S.C. § 7414(f)(2).

[146] 7 U.S.C. § 7414(g).

[147] Soybean Promotion, Research, and Information Program: Results of Soybean Request for Referendum, 89 Fed. Reg. 79885 (Oct. 1, 2024); Determination for Conducting a Continuance Referendum Regarding Amendments to the Cotton Research and Promotion Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 72203 (Dec. 21, 2021).

[148] Farm Action, supra note 3.

[149] Soybean Promotion, Research, and Information Program: Opportunity to Request a Referendum, 89 Fed. Reg. 7353 (Feb. 2, 2024).

[150] 7 U.S.C. § 6305(b)(3)(C).

[151] 7 U.S.C. § 6305(b)(3)(B).

[152] 7 U.S.C. § 6305(b)(1)(B).

[153] 89 Fed. Reg. 79885.

[154] Id.

[155] Farm Service Agency, FSA News, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.fsa.usda.gov/news-events/news [https://perma.cc/8BHU-KNHX] (last visited Feb. 10, 2025).

[156] Farm Service Agency, National Deadlines for FSA, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.fsa.usda.gov/news-events/national-deadlines [https://perma.cc/S5PR-M8C7] (last visited Feb. 10, 2025).

[157] Farm Service Agency, Find a Program, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.fsa.usda.gov/resources/programs [https://perma.cc/D5F3-9AN9] (last visited Feb. 10, 2025).

[158] Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 7417(f).

---